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ON INSURANCE CONTRACT DESIGN 








This paper extends the analysis of insurance contracts design to the case of "low probability events", 
when there is a probability mass on the "no accident-zero loss"-event. The optimality of the deductible clause is 
discussed both at the theoretical and empirical levels. 
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1 Introduction 
Since Arrow (1963) is is well known that efficient insurance policies involve deductibles. Raviv 
(1979) has shown that the result still holds under various assumptions on the shape of the insurer's 
cost. Karni (1992), Machina (1995) and Carlier, Dana and Shahidi (2003) have shown that it can be 
extended to several non-expected utility models of choice under risk. The scope of Arrow's theorem 
has been enlarged by Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) and Vergnaud (1997), who have used stochastic 
dominance arguments in order to establish the superiority of deductible policies for a broader class of 
the insured's preferences (see Gollier (2000) for a survey). Finally, the result has also been extended in 
contexts including multiple risks by Cummins and Mahul (2003), Mahul (1999, 2000a,b), Mahul and 
Wright  (2004),  and  is  the  starting  point  of  several  studies  on  the  determination  of  the  optimal 
deductible levels (Schlesinger (1981), Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1999)). 
This paper aims first at assessing the robustness of deductible clause to the relaxation of the 
smoothness assumption of the loss distribution (section 3). Second, it studies the sensibility of the 
contract to the  probability  of loss  (section 4) and  to  the  other  parameters  (risk-aversion, insurer's 
loading factor) of the model. I show, considering that there is a probability-mass on the no accident-no 
loss state as it is the case for small probability accidental events, that the existence of a variable cost in 
insurance is still necessary but not sufficient to obtain a positive deductible in the expected utility 
model. In Arrow's case of constant returns to scale in insurance, sufficiency requires large values for 
the insurer's marginal cost - i.e. a marginal cost higher than a threshold which is increasing in the 
probability of no accident - which are empirically implausible. Finally, a simple calibration of the 
model also shows that the optimal deductible displays a lack of sensibility to the probability (mass) of 
accident, and that large deductibles are still efficient, unless high values for the risk-aversion index are 
introduced. The next section first describes the model. 
 
2 Model and assumptions 
Assume that the initial wealth   0 w   of an individual is subject to a loss which is supposed to be 
a perfectly observable random variable   X   with a known probability distribution. I introduce a mixed 
mass and density representation for the distribution of   X  , whose realizations are taking values on  
] , 0 [ M  , with   0 ) 0 ( Pr 0 > = = p X ob  , and I denote   0 ) ( ) 1 ( 0 > − t f p   the density on  ] , 0 [ M  such 
that ] , 0 [ M x∈ ∀ : 
dt t f p x X ob
x ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( Pr 0 0 ∫ − = ≤ ≤  
 and   1 ) ( 0 = ∫ dt t f
M  . 
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The optimal insurance contract is a vector of transfers   ), ( { ; ( x I P  for all   ]}) , 0 [ M x∈   with  
P   the insurance premium and   ) (x I   the indemnity contingent on the value of the damage, defined 
as the solution to the maximization problem of the expected utility index of the insured: 
 
dx x f x x I P w u p
P w u p EU
M








given the condition of premium (the insurer's participation constraint): 
 
dx x f x I c x I p P
M
) ( )]) ( [ ) ( ( ) 1 (
0 0 + − ≥ ∫  
and taking into account for the non-negativity constraints on the indemnity schedule: 
 
] , 0 [ , 0 ) ( M x x I ∈ ∀ ≥  
 
where  u   is the insured's utility, with   0 > ′ u  and   0 < ′ ′ u  ;   )] ( [ x I c   is the insurer's cost, with: 
0 ) 0 ( c c = ,  0 ) ( ≥ ′ I c   and   0 ) ( ≥ ′ ′ I c  . 
 
3 Analysis 
The first result is the analogue to theorem 1 in Raviv (1979). 
 











) ( : ) 1 (  
with a marginal coverage for all   D x >   given by: 
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)] ( [ 1
)) ( (
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u  
 
where:    ) (
) ( ) ( w u
w u u w T ′ ′
′ − =     is  the  insured's  index  of  absolute  risk  tolerance,  evaluated  at  
. ) ( 0 x x I P w w − + − =
∗   
 
Proof : Note that due to the monotony assumption on the preferences of both the insurer and the 
insured,  any  efficient  contract  requires  a  binding  participation  constraint  for  the  insurer.  Denote  
0 > λ     its  associated  shadow  price.  Denote    0 ) ( ≥ x µ     the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  to  a 
constraint of type (3). For any given fixed   0 > P  , the problem may be solved state by state i.e. for 
each value of   ] , 0 [ M x∈  ; the necessary and sufficient conditions (all functions are well behaved) for 
optimization are: 
 
) ( )]) ( [ 1 ( ) ) ( ( 0 x x I c x x I P w u µ λ − = ′ + − − + − ′  
with   0 ) ( = x µ   if   , 0 ) ( > x I   but   0 ) ( ≥ x µ   otherwise. Since the LHS in (4) is an increasing 
and continuous function of  x , there exists a unique   0 ≥ D  which is defined by: 
 
)) 0 ( 1 ( ) ( 0 c D P w u ′ + = − − ′ λ  
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and such that the optimal indemnity schedule is the one in (C1). Differentiating (4) in   x   in the 
range where   0 ) ( > x I  , and rearranging leads to the expression for the marginal coverage (C2). ■ 
 
Second  order  conditions  are  satisfied  since  every  function  is  well  behaved.  The  following 
proposition focuses on the existence of a non trivial deductible. 
 
Proposition 2 : i) Assume   0 0 > p  ; then: a)   0 > ′ c   is necessary for efficient contracts to 
involve a   0 > D  ; b) if   0 = ′ c  , then   0 = D   and the optimal contract provides full insurance of 
each loss. 
ii) Assume   0 0 = p  ; then, any efficient contract contains a strictly positive deductible if and 
only if   0 > ′ c  . 
 
Proof : Integrating condition (4) leads to: 
 
( )
) ( ) (
















The maximization of (1) under (2) with respect to  P   gives: 
 
λ = ′ − + − ′ ∫ ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (




Hence, condition (5) may also be written as: 
 
) ( )] ( [
) ( ) ( ) (




x dF x I c

















i)  Assume that  the  optimal policy contains  a strict  deductible    0 > D    with  a coinsurance 
arrangement above   D  such that according to proposition 1:   0 ) ( < − x x I  , and with   0 ) ( ≥ x µ   for  
x  smaller than  D . By concavity of   , u   we thus have for all   ] , 0 ] M x∈  : 
 
) ) ( ( ) ( 0 0 x x I P w u P w u − + − ′ ≤ − ′  
 
 and integrating both sides yields: 
 
0 ) ( ) ( ) (
0 0 <  

 




a) As a result, it must be that   0 > ′ c   in order that the RHS of (7) be positive. However, this is 
not sufficient: sufficiency requires either that the insurance premium entails a cost in terms of welfare 
high enough (see   0 > λ   in (6)) or that the (expected) marginal cost for the insurer be high enough. 
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b) On the other hand, assume that   0 = ′ c  ; then   0 ) ( < − x x I   at least for some   x  cannot be 
optimal since it implies that the LHS of (7) takes a negative sign, contradicting that   . 0 ) ( ≥ x µ   In 
contrast, a policy paying   x x I = ) (   for all   x  (zero deductible and full reimbursement of all losses) 
implies that the bracketed term is nil, and thus   0 ) ( = x µ   for all   x , such that (7) holds. 
ii) is the standard result (see Raviv (1979)), which is straightforward from (7) setting  0 0 = p . ■ 
 
The following corollary focuses on the specific case of Arrow (1963). 
 
Corollary  3:  Assume  that    t cons c tan = = ′ λ   .  There  exists  a  probability-threshold  
[ 1 , 0 ] ˆ 1 ∈ ≡ +λ
λ p   such that: 
i) if  0 p   is small enough in the sense that  p p ˆ 0 ≤ , then the optimal deductible is strictly 
positive. 
ii) if   0 p   is large enough in the sense that   p p ˆ 0 >  , then the optimal deductible may be nil. 
 





 − ′ − +




0 0 0 0
) ( )] ( [ ) 1 (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
p x dF x I c p







and when  , tant cons c = = ′ λ the bracketed term reduces to   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 0 0 0 λ λ λ + − = − − p p p . 
i) Assume that  p p p ˆ 0 ) 1 ( 0 0 ≤ ⇔ ≥ + − λ λ ; the RHS in (8) is strictly positive, implying that 
the LHS in (8) must also be positive at equilibrium: as a result, it exists some values of   x  for which  
0 ) ( > x µ  ; hence the result that efficient contracts contain a non trivial deductible. 
ii) Conversely, assume that: 
 
p p p ˆ 0 ) 1 ( 0 0 > ⇔ < + − λ λ  
 
Then the RHS in (8) may be either positive or negative, depending on the various parameters of 
the model and/or the shape of the insured's utility function, and in some cases the deductible may 
trivially be close to  0 = D . ■ 
 
The intuition of corollary 3 is that   0 p   is associated to the no-accident/no-loss event: thus, 
when   0 p   is small enough, the probability to pay the premium and being not compensated by the 
insurer is small. According to (5), the cost in terms of welfare due to the premium charged is spread 
among all the states of the nature; moreover, it is easily compensated by the insurance policy even 
when the coverage is concentrated on the states of the nature where the damage is the higher, since the 
marginal utility of wealth is the larger in those states. Thus, it is optimal for the insured to accept a 
positive deductible in order to lower the effective premium and obtain full compensation for the infra-
marginal losses over the deductible
1. In contrast, as   0 p   increases, the cost in terms of welfare is 
focused  on  the  no-accident  event  and  sometimes  it  may  not  be  compensated  by  insurance 
reimbursements unless the damage is paid back to the insured in each state of the nature. Providing 
almost full insurance would be optimal in such a situation. The argument is close to the one developed 
                                                
1 According to (C2), we have  1 ) ( =
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by Johnson and alii (1993). However, it is not clear whether this occurs for a reasonable numerical 
simulation of the expected-utility model, as we will show now. 
 
4 Discussion 
Let us focus on the case   . tant cons c = = ′ λ   
In this case, Arrow's famous theorem establishes that " if a insurance company is willing to 
offer an insurance policy against loss desired by the (expected-utility) buyer at a premium which 
depends only on the policy's actuarial value, then the policy chosen by the risk-averting buyer will 
take the form of of 100 percent coverage above a deductible minimum" (Arrow (1971)). Basically, it 
is  usually  recognized  that  the  deductible  clause  reflects  the  best  possible  trade-off  between  two 
conflicting objectives implicit to insurance contracting: on the one hand, the promise for the risk-
averse insured to obtain, at a reasonable price, the highest possible coverage for the most severe losses 
he  may  be  facing;  on  the  other,  the  willingness  of  the  insurer  to  minimize  the  transaction  costs 
incurred in its activity, since these costs represent a dead-weight loss on any contract. As a result, risk-
averse consumers never purchase insurance against small losses for which the benefits obtained are 
smaller than the transaction costs incurred to fill these claims. From a practical point of view, the 
problem  of  insuring  any  risk  for  any  risk-averse  consumer  becomes  a  simple  one,  whatever  the 
characteristics  (nature)  of  this  risk:  the  selection  of  an  optimal  deductible  level.  Our  results  is 
consistent  with  this  view,  but  cast  some  doubt  about  whether  high  deductibles  are  desirable  for 
insuring low probability events, and/or how the deductible is sensible to the probability (mass) of 
accident. 
The first issue is the extent to which   p p ˆ 0 ≤   may appear as a stringent sufficient condition. 
Due  to  a  lack  of  information  about  the  costs  structure  in  different  insurance  lines,  the  sufficient 
condition in corollary 3ii) may be equivalently stated in terms of a threshold value for the marginal 






− = λ   the deductible policy is still efficient. 
Sufficiency says now that the larger the probability of no loss the larger the marginal cost incurred by 
insurer  required  to  obtain  a  deductible  clause.  In  practice  individuals  are  exposed  to  very  small 
probability events during their lifetime. The most frequent risks such as affecting both their human and 
non-human  wealth  correspond  to  values  for  0 1 p −   smaller  than   
3 10
−     (in  annual  rate).  It  is 
straightforward to see that for deductible policies to be optimal, it must be that the loading factor be 
closed to huge values; for an example, take   4000 / 1 1 0 = − p  , then   3999
~
= λ  . Such huge values 
are empirically unlikely. 
Finally,  let  us  consider  as  an  illustrative  example  the  following  calibration  of  the  model. 
Assume  that    X     is  uniformly  distributed  on    ] , 0 [ M     with    M t f 1 ) ( =     and  suppose  that  the 







1 ) ( w w u  . We assume that  
300000 = w   and   250000 = M  . 
In  the  next  tables,  we  display  the  results  of  the  simulation  for  the  sensibility  of  both  the 
premium (based on the variable cost of the insurer
2 i.e. up to the fixed-cost of the insurer, due to the 
lack of information on   0 c  ) and the deductible to: the probability   0 p  , the risk-aversion parameter  θ   
and marginal cost (loading factor)  λ . 






                                                
2 The value of the premium charged by the insurer is given by:  
( )( ) 0 2
1 . ) 1 (
2 2
0 c D M P D M
M
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Table 1. Sensibility to  p0    
(  % 10 ; 2 = = λ θ  ) 
13963 428 , 20 1
13963 514 , 24 1
13963 642 , 30 1
13975 26 , 204 1
13978 11 , 245 1




















− D c P p
 
 
Table 1 shows that the premium  charged by the insurer is far more sensible to the risk of 
accident ( P   decreases with   0 p  ) than the deductible:  D  decreases with   0 p   but as the probability 
of no-accident becomes enough large,  D  is almost constant. 
The value   2 = θ   is generally seen as a reasonable one for the relative risk-aversion index. 
However, several studies (see for example Mehra and Prescott (1985), Kocherlakota (1990)) have 
provided arguments that larger values of  θ   may be plausible, at least useful, to provide the solutions 
to several empirical puzzles in the area of consumer's behavior on financial markets. Table 2 considers 
cases where 2 ≥ θ : 
 
Table 2. Sensibility to  θ   
 (  % 10 ; 1 4000
1
0 = − = λ p ) 
2849 596 , 33 10
7064 460 , 32 4
9382 843 , 31 3
13963 642 , 30 2
0 D c P − θ
 
 
Table 2 shows now in contrast to table 1, that the deductible is more sensible to the insured's 
risk-aversion index than the premium.   P   increases with  θ   and   D  decreases with  θ   - however, 
the increase in the premium is smaller than the decrease in the deductible, in the sense than doubling  
θ   allows to divide the deductible by almost a factor  2 , while the increase in the premium is quite 
moderate. Moreover, it appears that the expected-utility model cannot explain that small deductibles 
may be desirable, unless we consider the opportunity of a large risk-aversion index. 
 
Table 3. Sensibility to  λ   
(  2 ; 1 4000
1
0 = − = θ p  ) 
36888 521 , 29 % 30
26143 067 , 30 % 20
13963 642 , 30 % 10
0 D c P− λ
 
The last issue is the influence of the loading factor, which has a key role in Arrow's analysis. 
The  last  table  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  the  insurer's  (constant)  marginal  cost  and  the 
optimal insurance contract. Table 3 shows that the increase in the loading factor (insurer's marginal Journal of Applied Economic Journal of Applied Economic Journal of Applied Economic Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  Sciences  Sciences  Sciences            
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cost) affects more the deductible than the premium charged by the insurer. Multiplying the loading 
factor requires almost doubling the deductible level. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Despite the attractiveness of Arrow's theorem and the generalizations afforded, it is well known 
that it does not match so easily empirical findings. Both experimental evidences and data on effective 
insurance  purchases  show  that  consumers  do  not  like  (large)  deductibles.  Johnson  and  ali  (1993) 
argued that the even assumption according to which the insurance premium is perceived as a segregate 
loss actually implies that expected utility-based models are not able to explain why consumers actually 
reject deductible. The argument is as follows. Consider a risk with a small probability of occurrence 
and a large probability of no loss; for the consumer, the no accident-no loss state is perceived as a 
segregate state: it is associated to a segregate cost, the insurance premium, implying a high loss of 
welfare since it is not compensated by the payment of an indemnity. Hence, to compensate this cost, 
the insured will accept any contract which yields sufficiently high expected benefits in case of loss 
through the payment of the indemnity. It can be the case that it is obtained only through coinsurance 
contracts, associated to an admissible premium - based on expected costs which are not excessive for 
the insurer as compared to the small probability of loss. In words, the efficient design of insurance 
contracts for low probability events reflects a trade-off between two dead weight losses: the premium 
paid by the insured and the transactions costs incured by the insurer. On the other hand, Chichilnisky 
(2000) argued that the expected utility functional displays insensitivity to small-probabilities events, 
and  thus  is  not  an  appropriate  tool  to  analyze  decision  problems  with  small  probability  events 
(emerging from environmental risks or more generally from catastrophic risks). 
To summarize, our findings are in some sense more conservative: the expected-utility model 
predicts that the deductible displays a weak sensibility to the probability (mass) of accident but a more 
significant  sensibility  to  the  loading  factor  in  insurance  and/or  to  the  risk-aversion  index  of  the 
insured. We also find that in order to rationalize small deductible levels, we need large values of the 
(relative) risk-aversion index, a result consistent with previous findings on financial markets. 
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